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NOTES
Lafleur v. John Deere Co.: No Recovery of Delictual
Damages for the Sale of a Useless Product
Two plaintiffs, the purchaser and the user of an allegedly defective
grain drill, sued the manufacturer, John Deere, and the seller, F. Hollier
& Sons, seeking both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. In addition
to damages for crop losses and expenses, the lower courts awarded
$125,000 and $10,000, respectively, for mental anguish damages. The
Louisiana Supreme Court reversed this portion of the judgment, holding
that the plaintiffs were not entitled to their non-pecuniary damage awards.
The court stated that the plaintiffs had produced only "scant" proof
to support a mental pain and anguish award and that "such worry is
not within the scope of the risk to which is extended Deere's duty to
deliver a useful grain drill." Lafleur v. John Deere Co., 491 So. 2d
624, 631 (La. 1986).
In finding insufficient proof to support the non-pecuniary damage
award, the supreme court admittedly sidestepped the "tough questions"
raised by this case.' Specifically, the court left unanswered the question
of whether the manufacturer of a product which is not unreasonably
dangerous 2 but merely useless3 has breached a tort duty as well as a
contractual duty.4 An affirmative answer to this question would allow
Copyright 1987, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.
1. Lafleur v. John Deere Co., 491 So. 2d 624, 631 (La. 1986).
2. In Weber v. Fidelity Casualty Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971), the
supreme court, in applying the doctrine of strict liability in tort to manufacturers of
unreasonably dangerous products, stated:
A manufacturer of a product which involves a risk of injury to the user is
liable to any person, whether the purchaser or a third person, who without
fault on his part, sustains an injury caused by a defect in the design, composition,
or manufacture of the article, if the injury might reasonably have been antic-
ipated. However, the plaintiff claiming injury has the burden of proving that
the product was defective, i. e., unreasonably dangerous to normal use, and
that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by reason of the defect.
Id. at 602-03, 250 So. 2d at 755.
3. La. Civ. Code art. 2520 provides:
Redhibition is the avoidance of a sale on account of some vice or defect in
the thing sold, which renders it either absolutely useless, or its use so inconvenient
and imperfect, that it must be supposed that the buyer would not have purchased
it, had he known of the vice.
4. Since the word "defect" will be used throughout this note, the unmodified use
of "defect" will refer to the Weber-strict liability tort defect (see supra note 2). Any
other defects, such as redhibitory defects (see supra note 3) will be specified.
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
any person having a redhibition or qtanti minoris claim also to assert
a tort action against the bad faith seller'. Allowing these multiple grounds
for recovery, it is submitted, would confuse the already blurred dis-
tinction between tort and redhibition and would ignore the code articles
governing sales which specifically provide for the recovery of damages
arising from the buyer/seller relationship.
This note will analyze both the appellate court and supreme court
opinions in Lafleur. Before discussing the opinions, the traditional ci-
vilian distinction between contractual fault and delictual fault will be
examined, as well as the development of the idea of unity of fault,
particularly with reference to the Louisiana jurisprudence, This discussion
is necessary to adequately develop the background from which the
Lafleur case arose.
Contract Vs. Delict
An obligation is a legal relationship whereby a person is bound to
render a performance in favor of another. 6 Historically, a distinction
has been drawn between contractual obligations, which arise from the
will of the parties in the form of consent, and delictual obligations,
which are imposed by law regardless of the parties' will.7
The violation of any obligation requires fault on the part of the
obligor. Planiol, in discussing the distinctions between contractual fault
and delictual fault, stated: "Contractual fault is that which is committed
on the occasion of the execution of a contract. It consists in violating
a contractual obligation. As to the delictual fault, most authors say that
it is 'an act productive of obligations which takes place between persons
juridically strangers to each other."'" Thus, contractual fault is said to
arise from the inexecution of a pre-existing obligation, whereas delictual
fault arises from an act which creates an obligation where one previously
did not exist.
Another important distinction between contractual fault and delictual
fault is the manner in which each fault is proved. Delictual fault must
be specifically proved. 9 An injured victim must show that the tortfeasor
was at fault and that this fault caused him injury. Contractual fault,
however, may be presumed in certain instances. In an obligation to
5. La. Civ. Code art. 2545. Since a manufacturer is presumed to have knowledge
of defects in its products, it is characterized as a bad faith seller under art. 2345. See,
e.g., Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 395 So. 2d 310, 318 n.15 (La. 1980).
6. La. Civ. Code art. 1756.
7. Tete, Tort Roots and Ramifications of the Obligations Revision, 32 Loy. L. Rev.
47, 54 (1986). See also La. Civ. Code art. 1757.
8. 2 M. Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law, No. 873, at 485. (11th ed. L. S. L.
Inst. transl. 1939).
9. 2 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 182, at 344, in 7 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1975).
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provide a particular result, for instance, contractual fault can be pre-
sumed from the material fact of non-performance.' 0 Once an obligee
establishes that a contract to provide a certain result was not performed,
the burden of justifying the non-performance rests with the obligor.
Thus the obligee can prevail without "hav[ing] to prove the obligor's
fault in a distinct manner."'
i
The Louisiana Civil Code has maintained distinctions between con-
tract and delict. These differences are most noticeable in the areas of
prescription and damages. The Civil Code establishes a prescriptive
period of one year for delicts,' 2 while contracts, Which are considered
personal actions, are subject to a ten year prescriptive period..3 The
characterization of an action as contractual or delictual is therefore
determinative of the appropriate prescriptive period.
The characterization of an action is also important with respect to
damages. Civil Code article 2315, the fundamental source of delictual
liability in Louisiana, requires a person to repair the damage that his
fault has caused. The obligation of repair requires the injuring party
to put the victim in the position that he would have occupied if the
injury complained of had not been inflicted. 4 This restoration has been
held to include reparation for items such as physical suffering and
inconvenience, permanent injuries, loss of earnings and services, impaired
earning capacity, expenses incurred, and mental suffering. Furthermore,
much discretion is left to the judge or jury in the assessment of delictual
damages. 5
Regarding contractual liability, an obligor is liable for the damages
caused by his failure to perform a conventional obligation. 6 Damages
are measured by two elements: the loss sustained by the obligee and
the profit of which he has been deprived. 7 The obligor in good faith
is liable only for the damages that were reasonably foreseeable at the
time the contract was made, while the obligor in bad faith is liable for
all damages, foreseeable or not, that are a direct (i.e. necessary) con-
sequence of the failure to perform. 8 Furthermore, damages for non-
pecuniary losses are recoverable only if the principal object of the
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. La. Civ. Code art. 3492.
13. La. Civ. Code art. 3499. See also infra text accompanying notes 59 and 60
discussing prescriptive periods in a redhibitory action.
14. Coleman v. Victor, 326 So. 2d 344 (La. 1976).
15. La. Civ. Code art. 2324.1.
16. La. Civ. Code art. 1994.
17. La. Civ. Code art. 1995.
18. La. Civ. Code arts. 1996, 1997.
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contract is intended to gratify a non-pecuniary or intellectual interest. 19
Professor Litvinoff, discussing the contractual theory of damages,
has stated:
[T]he obligor is bound to make reparation for the damage that
his faulty nonperformance has caused the obligee, as every man
is held to repair the damage that he causes to another through
his fault. There is thus a contractual responsibility as there is
a delictual; and the similarity is oftentimes striking. Contractual
damages are the projection of an organized pre-existing relation
between obligee and obligor, while delictual damages may be
due between strangers placed in the presence of each other by
mere fate. 20
Unity of Fault
While Planiol acknowledged that the dualistic theory of fault was
firmly entrenched in French legal doctrine, he believed that the difference
between contractual fault and delictual fault was superficial and lacked
foundation. Both faults create an obligation of repairing the damage
caused and both consist of an act which violates a pre-existing obligation.
"Only, the case in which the fault is called delictual, the obligation
violated is a legal obligation, having ordinarily as its object a negative
act, an abstention."'2 Following his refutation of dualistic fault, Planiol
asserted the idea of unity of fault:
We must understand: if one wishes to speak of a distinction
to be made in the practice between contractual obligations and
legal obligations, perhaps one may find some provision of the
positive law which makes such distinction desirable; but if one
tries to establish a specific difference between the faults from
the rational or doctrinal point of view, the distinction commonly
admitted is not only contestable; it has neither sense nor reason
for being. The nature of the obligation violated has no bearing
on the fault. 22
The basic idea behind unity of fault is that contractual and delictual
fault are fundamentally similar. In either case, a court will not hold a
person civilly liable for damages unless it finds 1) fault (i.e. a breach
of duty) on the part of the defendant; 2) pecuniary or non-pecuniary
19. La. Civ. Code art. 1998. See also La. Civ. Code art. 1934(3) (1870), discussed
infra in note 73.
20. 2 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 179, at 336-37, in 7 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1975) (emphasis added).
21. Planiol, supra note 8, No. 876 at 487.
22. Id., No. 877 at 488.
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damages sustained by the plaintiff; and 3) a causal link between the
defendant's fault and the plaintiff's damages. 23 "These three conditions
are essential in any civil claim and this [is] irrespective of the judicial
basis of the action." '24 A proponent of unity of fault has summarized
the theory by stating, "[c]ivil responsibility rests essentially on the vi-
olation of a juridical obligation, be it contractual or legal, and ...
basically there is no intrinsic difference between a fault, be it voluntary
or involuntary, according to whether it arises from the breach of a
contractual obligation or from the violation of a legal duty." ' 25
Under unity of fault, it is easy to see how courts can justify an
award of damages based on multiple grounds of recovery. If delictual
and contractual fault are "fundamentally one and the same ' 26 then
"[tihe same acts or omissions may constitute breaches of both general
duties and contractual duties giving rise to actions in both tort and
contract.' 2 7
Unity of Fault in Louisiana
A survey of the Louisiana jurisprudence reveals not only a theoretical
recognition of unity of fault but an evolution of the idea as well. 28 One
of the earliest Louisiana decisions recognizing the unity of fault theory
was Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. New Orleans Terminal Co. 29 The
defendant had contracted with Illinois Central to provide for the safe
movement of Illinois Central's trains. The negligence of the defendant's
employee resulted in a head on collision, and Illinois Central sued for
damages more than a year after the accident. The defendant, contending
that the cause of action was in tort, pled prescription. Justice Provosty,
speaking for the court, stated:
There is no doubt that the action of the defendant ... amounted
to a tort; but there is no reason why the breach of a contract
23. Crepeau, Civil Responsibility: A Contribution Towards Rediscovery of Contractual
Liability, in Essays on the Civil Law of Obligations 86 (J. Dainow ed. 1969).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 87.
26. Id.
27. Franklin v. Able Moving and Storage Co., 439 So. 2d 489, 491 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1983). See also Free v. Franklin Guest Home, Inc. 397 So. 2d 47 (La. App. 2d
Cir.), writ denied, 401 So. 2d 975 (La. 1981); Federal Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N.
A., 262 La. 509, 263 So. 2d 871 (1972).
28. "French law in principle will not allow an action in delict where the alleged fault
arises from the non-performance or bad performance of a contractual obligation." If a
contractual remedy is available, French law will not allow a delictual action. Herbots,
Economic Loss In The Legal Systems Of The Continent, in The Law of Tort 139 (M.
Furmston ed. 1986).
29. 143 La. 4671 78 So. 738 (1918).
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by means of a tort should not furnish ground for an action
for breach of contract .... Because a certain act of omission
or commission violates the general duty which a person owes
to society not to injure another is no reason why it should not,
at the same time, violate a special duty owing to this other by
virtue of a contract to do or not to do that particular thing,
and why the violation of the latter duty should not furnish a
cause of action. The measure of damages may be different for
the injury caused by an act accordingly as the act is viewed as
a breach of contract or as a tort; and, clearly, the party injured
should be entitled to the one or the other action accordingly as
his interest may dictate. For breach of contract without fraud
or bad faith only those damages which entered into the con-
templation of the parties at the time of making the contract
may be recovered. Whereas for tort all and whatever damages
resulting directly from the act or negligence complained of may
be recovered.30
In explaining this position, the court quoted an excerpt from Fuzier-
Herman, Repertoire du Droit Francais, Vo. Responsabilite, No. 4, which
contained language virtually identical to that of Planiol.3' Additionally,
it is important to note that the court allowed the injured party to elect
which action he would pursue. This election of remedies notion was
followed in subsequent cases,32 occasionally to the detriment of the
injured party.33
An important step in the development of Louisiana's unity of fault
theory occurred in Federal Insurance Co. v. Insurance Co. of North
America,3 4 a suit for damage to. leased equipment. Federal Insurance,
30. Id. at 473, 78 So. at 740 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 475-76, 78 So. at 741. See supra text accompanying note 22.
32. See Kramer v. Freeman, 198 La. 244, 3 So. 2d 609 (1941); American Heating
& Plumbing Co. v. West End Country Club, 171 La. 482, 131 So. 466 (1930); Wilson
v. Scurlock Oil Co., 126 So. 2d 429 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960); Spencer v. West, 126 So.
2d 423 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960); Olinde Hardware & Supply Co. v. Ramsey, 98 So. 2d
835 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
33. See Importsales, Inc. v. Lindeman, 231 La. 663, 92 So. 2d 574 (1957) (Action
against the widow of a former sales agent for the value of merchandise that the agent
allegedly refused to return. The court considered the allegations and prayer of the plaintiff's
petition and concluded that the action was "clearly ex delicto for damages to the amount
of the value of the merchandise (not one ex contractu for restitution of the property or
for the proceeds of sales thereof)," and sustained the defendant's plea of prescription.);
Parro v. Fifteen Oil Co., 26 So. 2d 30 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946) (Action against the
assignee of a mineral lease for damages to surface land. After considering the entire
petition, the court concluded that the plaintiff had based his action in tort and upheld
the defendant's plea prescription.).
34. 262 La. 509, 263 So. 2d 871 (1972).
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the subrogee of the lessor, sued the lessee and the lessee's insurance
company more than a year after the date of the alleged negligent act.
Both the trial court and the court of appeal maintained the defendants'
plea of prescription, based on the conclusion that the "petition sounded
in tort and . . .was prescribed under Civil Code Article 3536." 3 5
The supreme court, finding that the suit was based on the contract
of lease, reversed. The court recognized its numerous decisions which
had allowed a party who was damaged by the conduct of another arising
from a contractual relationship to recover damages in either a suit in
contract or an action in tort. "In such cases, the prescription applicable
is determined by the character which plaintiff gives his pleadings and
the form of his action." '3 6 Although the petition contained allegations
of particular acts of negligence, the court found that these "were nec-
essary to plaintiff's action in contract" and that the petition's language
"specifically and plainly" stated that the action was in contract. 7
Of particular importance in the Federal Insurance decision is the
often cited concurrence by Justice Tate. He emphasized that the majority
opinion was in accordance with the basic rationale of the 1960 Code
of Civil Procedure.
The 1960 Code of Civil Procedure, which has as its aim
ultimate and substantial justice rather than procedural techni-
cality, sought to suppress "the harsh and unduly technical 'the-
ory of the case' doctrine in Louisiana, under which the litigant
must select a theory of his case or defense and adhere to it
throughout the litigation.
In cases such as this one, a plaintiff who pleads and proves
the necessary facts should be allowed to recover under any
available theory, whether tort, quasi contract, or contract. To
bar recovery simply by strictly construing the pleadings is to
abandon the spirit of the 1960 Code of Civil Procedure. 8
Rather than forcing a plaintiff to elect and adhere to a theory of
the case, he is only required to allege the material facts constituting a
cause of action. These facts are then liberally construed in his favor. 39
In situations akin to the instant case, in which both contractual and
delictual actions are available, Justice Tate opined, "The better view of
our Louisiana jurisprudence is that the plaintiff retains the right of
35. Id at 512, 263 So. 2d at 872.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 515, 263 So. 2d at 873.
38., Id. at 515-18, 263 So. 2d at 874 (Tate, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
39. Id.
19871
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election between concurrent remedies, when the facts pleaded justify
either.' 40
Two landmark "consumer protection" decisions, Weber v. Fidelity
Casualty Ins. Co.41 and Media Production Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-
Benz of North America,42 laid the foundation for the next significant
movement in Louisiana's unity of fault theory. Weber applied the doc-
trine of strict liability in tort to all manufactured products and extended
the right of action to any user of the product. Media eliminated the
traditional lack of privity defense by extending the manufacturer's im-
plied warranty to ultimate purchasers. The supreme court further elab-
orated on the Media holding in Rey v. Cuccia:43 "In effect, the consumer's
cause of action, which is based upon the breach of the sale's implied
warranty, is enforceable directly against the manufacturer, who himself
is by law bound to the same implied warranty. ' 44
Cases following Weber and Media have allowed the injured purchaser
of an unreasonably dangerous product two causes of action-a strict
liability action in tort and a redhibition action. 4 A strict liability action
obviates the plaintiff's burden of proving negligence, since a manufac-
turer is presumed to have knowledge of his product's defects.4 6 The
injured party is only required to show that 1) the product is defective
(i.e. unreasonably dangerous to normal use); 2) the injury was foresee-
able; and 3) the injury was caused by the defect while the product was
in normal use.47 Damages recoverable in a strict liability action are
delictual in nature. 41
Redhibition is the avoidance of a sale due to a vice or defect in
the thing sold which renders it either absolutely useless or so inconvenient
to use that, had the buyer known of the defect, he would not have
purchased it.49 A sale is a nominate contract and, while subject to the
rules governing conventional obligations, 0 is governed by special rules
applying to sales.5 "The redhibition action is highly structured and
described with great specificity in the appropriate articles of the Civil
40. Id. at 518-19, 263 So. 2d at 875 (Tate, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
41. 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971), discussed supra in note 2.
42. 262 La. 80, 262 So. 2d 377 (1972).
43. 298 So. 2d 840 (La. 1974).
44. Id. at 845.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 62-71.
46. Weber, 259 La. at 603, 250 So. 2d at 756. For a good discussion of this
presumption see Robertson, Manufacturers' Liability For Defective Products in Louisiana
Law, 50 Tul. L. Rev. 50, at 56.
47. Crawford, Products Liability-The Cause of Action, 22 La. B. J. 239, 246 (1975).
48. See supra text accompanying notes 14 and 15.
49. La. Civ. Code art. 2520. For text of the article, see supra note 3.
50. La. Civ. Code art. 1915.
51. La. Civ. Code art. 1916.
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Code; a significant body of jurisprudence has further refined and de-
lineated its requirements. ' 5 2
To maintain a redhibition action, a buyer must show that the thing
he purchased contained a non-apparent redhibitory defect53 which existed
before the sale was made.14 The Code distinguishes between a good faith
seller (one who does not know of the vice)55 and a bad faith seller (one
who knows the vice of the thing he sells and fails to declare it).16 A
good faith seller is only bound to repair, remedy or correct the vice.
This implicitly requires the buyer to tender the item for repair. If the
seller is unable or fails to correct the vice, then he must restore the
purchase price, and reimburse the reasonable expenses occasioned by
the sale, as well as those incurred for the preservation of the thing,
subject to a credit for the value of any fruits or use which the purchaser
has drawn from it. 1 The bad faith seller, besides the restitution of the
price and repayment of expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees,
is answerable to the buyer in damages.5 8 The action against the good
faith seller must be commenced within a year from the date of the
sale,59 while the action against the bad faith seller may be commenced
at any time within a year from the discovery of the vice. 6°
Since, according to Weber and Media, the purchaser of an unrea-
sonably dangerous product has concurrent remedies, the rationale of
Federal Insurance would require the court to liberally construe the facts
pleaded to determine the character of the purchaser's action. If the facts
pleaded justify recovery under each remedy, the plaintiff would retain
the right of electing the remedy that his interests dictate. However,
rather than allowing the plaintiff to recover under either one theory or
the other, the subsequent jurisprudence has allowed recovery under both
theories simultaneously. 6 1
52. Note, Attorney's Fees in Louisiana Products Liability: Philippe v. Browning
Arms Co., 42 La. L. Rev. 298, 305 (1981).
53. La. Civ. Code art. 2521. See also Demars v. Natchitoches Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 353 So. 2d 433 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977), writ denied, 354 So. 2d 1384 (La. 1978).
54. La. Civ. Code art. 2530.
55. La. Civ. Code art. 2531.
56. La. Civ. Code art. 2545.
57. La. Civ. Code art. 2531.
58. La. Civ. Code art. 2545.
59. La. Civ. Code art. 2534.
60. La. Civ. Code art. 2546.
61. Louisiana courts' definition of "either theory" has evolved from an interpretation
of the term to mean "one theory or the other" to an interpretation of the term to mean
"each or both." This progression can be noted in the following cases: Illinois Cent. R.R.
Co. v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 143 La. 467, 78 So. 738 (1918); American Heating
& Plumbing Co. v. West End Country Club, 171 La. 482, 131 So. 466 (1930); Lafleur
v. Brown, 223 La. 976, 67 So. 2d 556 (1953); Federal Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N.
A., 262 La. 509, 263 So. 2d 871 (1972); Harris v. Bardwell, 373 So. 2d 777 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1979); Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 395 So. 2d 310 (La. 1980).
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In Harris v. Bardwell,62 the plaintiff sought recovery in redhibition
and alternatively in tort for permanent injuries sustained due to a
defectively installed boat seat. The seat came loose during an abrupt
turn and the plaintiff was thrown into the water where he was run over
twice by the circling boat. The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of
Appeal, after referring to "Weber-Media and their progeny" and noting
that "the damage caused a buyer by a defective thing he has purchased
smacks of both contract and tort, ' 63 stated, "Recovery under one theory
should not preclude recovery under another theory where the circum-
stances warrant. Personal injury damages, whether under 2315, Weber,
or 2545, and attorney fees under CC 2545, are recoverable here." 64
The supreme court went a step further in Philippe v. Browning
Arms Co.65 Philippe involved a suit by a purchaser of a shotgun against
the manufacturer and importer for injuries sustained when the shotgun
accidentally discharged, severing the purchaser's right thumb. On original
hearing the court denied the plaintiff's request for attorfleys' fees, rea-
soning that "in this case, in which rescission of the sale was not sought
by plaintiff, but only damages arising from his personal injuries, at-
torneys' fees under Article 2545 are not payable." ' 6  Upon rehearing,
the court reversed its view and awarded attorneys' fees, stating that its
original analysis represented "a return to the requirement of pleading
the theory of the case, which we reject on rehearing. '67 In justifying
the combination of tort and rehibition recovery, Justice Lemmon stated:
There is no compelling reason to require a person injured by
a defective product he has purchased to proceed either in contract
or tort. The seller's (manufacturer's) act of delivering a defective
thing, when he knows of the defect, gives rise to delictual, as
well as contractual, liability .... [T]he right and the extent of
recovery by the purchaser of a thing against the seller or man-
ufacturer is governed by the codal articles providing for re-
sponsibility in the seller-purchaser relationship, as applied through
C.C. art. 2315.68
This language has led to confusion. The recognition of unity of
fault was the initial departure from Louisiana's codal scheme, which
62. 373 So. 2d 777 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
63. Id. at 783. The court cited both the majority and concurring opinions of Federal
Insurance for the proposition that the purchaser of a defective thing may recover damages
under either theory- tort or contract.
64. Id. at 784.
65. 395 So. 2d 310 (La. 1980).
66. Id. at 313.
67. Id. at 318.
68. Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
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provides distinct remedies for a breach of duty based upon the source
of the obligation giving rise to the duty. These practical distinctions69
recognized in the Louisiana Civil Code are what Planiol referred to as
''some provision of the positive law which makes such distinctions
[between contractual and delictual fault] desirable. ' 70 Philippe wanders
further by applying a delictual liability provision to a contractual duty,
thus circumventing the code articles which provide a contractual remedy
and ignoring the codal and jurisprudential requirements for maintaining
a redhibitory action. Although this holding may be desirable from a
consumer protection standpoint, the broad -language has presented dif-
ficulties. A prime example of these problems appears in Lafleur v. John
Deere Co.
The Third Circuit's View in Lafleur v. John Deere Co.7'
Larry Fontenot purchased a John Deere 8300 grain drill from F.
Hollier & Sons to plant his and Arlen Lafleur's soybean crops. Due to
an improperly working gauge wheel (which regulated the planting depth),
the seeds were planted too shallowly. As a result, Fontenot's and La-
fleur's crops yielded only thirty percent of the parish average. The crop
was Fontenot's first, and he had borrowed over $84,000 to plant and
harvest it. Due to the disastrous yield, Fontenot was unable to pay his
debts and ultimately lost his farming business. The entire situation caused
both him and Lafleur great anxiety.
Fontenot and Lafleur sued the manufacturer and the seller of the
defective implement. Following the trial, the jury awarded Fontentot
$6,178 as a return of the purchase price, $15,678.75 for expenses in-
curred, $60,820 for crop loss, $69,225 for attorneys' fees, and $125,000
for mental anguish. The trial judge awarded Lafleur, the user of the
implement, $55,388.03 for crop loss and $10,000 for mental anguish,
stress and inconvenience.
On appeal, the third circuit upheld the trial court's award of mental
anguish damages despite the defendants' contentions that 1) the plaintiffs
did not receive bodily injury, and 2) non-pecuniary damages are not
allowed in contract cases unless the contract has as its principal object
69. See supra text accompanying notes 12-19 and 52-60.
70. See full quotation in supra text accompanying note 22. For a general discussion,
see Crepeau, supra note 23.
71. Lafleur v. F. Hollier & Sons, 478 So. 2d 1390 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985), which
was affirmed by the third circuit for reasons assigned in its companion case, Fontenot
v. F. Hollier & Sons, 478 So. 2d 1379 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985). For this reason, the
Fontenot opinion will be discussed.
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"the gratification of some intellectual enjoyment. 7 It dismissed the
first contention on the authority of its own precedent which allowed
recovery for mental anguish when property was damaged even though
no bodily injury was sustained. 73 As to the second contention, the court
reviewed the jurisprudence since Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson74 and
concluded that "the Meador rule is no longer inflexibly applied to
preclude awards of non-pecuniary damages. '"7 This conclusion was based
on several post-Meador cases, 76 in particular Philippe v. Browning Arms
Co.77 and Bourne v. Rein Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 78
Philippe, as discussed earlier, stands for the proposition that the
manufacturer's act of delivering a defective product gives rise to both
contractual and delictual liability. 79 Bourne was a suit for the reduction
of the purchase price of an automobile. Following the trial court's award
of $5000 for mental anguish, the first circuit faced the question of
whether non-pecuniary damages were "clearly not recoverable" in a
redhibition or quanti minoris action. The court, after reviewing both
72. This is known as the Meador rule, and was derived from the supreme court's
interpretation of former civil code article 1934(3) in Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, 332
So. 2d 433 (La. 1976). In Meador, the automobile owner sought to recover damages
caused by undue delay (approximately seven months) in the repair of the auto. The court
interpreted article 1934(3) as allowing non-pecuniary damages for a breach of contract
only when the principal object of the contract is intellectual enjoyment. Since the pro-
curement of intellectual enjoyment was not the principal object of the contract of repair,
the court reversed the plaintiff's award of damages for aggravation, distress and incon-
venience. Justice Dixon dissented, being of the opinion that recovery of damages for
which justice requires compensation should not be denied for the superficial reason that
the plaintiff's action is in contract, not tort.
There is no logical reason to allow recovery of such damages when property is
involved in cases delineated as "tort," and yet deny recovery of similar damages
when property is involved (as in this case), simply because the action is delineated
as "contract." Both involve a duty and a breach .... In the instant case,
plaintiff has proved, to the satisfaction of the trier of fact, that she suffered
inconvenience, distress and aggravation because of defendant's breach of duty.
She should recover therefore.
Id. at 439 (Dixon, J., dissenting).
73. See Carroll v. State Farm Ins. Co., 427 So. 2d 24 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
74. See supra note 72.
75. Fontenot, 478 So. 2d at 1386.
76. Pike v. Stephens Imports, 448 So. 2d 738 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984); Franklin v.
Able Moving & Storage Co., 439 So. 2d 489 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Ducote v. Arnold,
416 So. 2d 180 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 421 So. 2d 238 (La. 1982); Gele v.
Markey, 387 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1980). For a discussion of these cases, see Comment,
Recovering Non-Pecuniary Damages for Breach of Contract Under Louisiana Law, 47
La. L. Rev. 541 (1987).
77. 395 So. 2d 310 (La. 1980).
78. 463 So. 2d 1356 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984), writ denied, 468 So. 2d 570 (La.
1985).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 65-68.
NOTES
Meador and Philippe, decided that Philippe "mandates judicial repu-
diation of the blanket exclusion" of non-pecuniary damages in redhi-
bition or quanti minoris actions. "To knowingly sell a redhibitorily
defective product, such knowledge being imputed to a manufacturer, is
to do a tortious act."
80
Adopting the Bourne interpretation of Philippe, the court of appeal
upheld the jury's award of non-pecuniary damages to Fontenot. The
court noted that a strict application of the Meador rule would lead to
an unfair and illogical result-that is, the purchaser of the implement,
Fontenot, would be denied recovery for mental anguish simply because
his action was "intertwined with a redhibition action," while the user
of the implement, Lafleur, would be entitled to mental anguish damages
since his action was based solely in tort."'
Lafleur v. John Deere Co., the Supreme Court's View
The supreme court granted writs primarily to consider the award
of non-pecuniary damages for a contract that did not have intellectual
enjoyment as its principal object. The court of appeal's position that
"the Meador rule is no longer inflexibly applied" in contract cases was
''not well taken.'' 8 2 The court emphasized that "no opinion of this
Court after Meador has repudiated its holding, despite criticism by some
Law Review commentators." 83 The court distinguished Philippe as "a
products liability case with the significant delictual aspects which attend
such cases" and discounted Bourne as a nonauthoritative denial of a
writ.84 The court also stressed that efforts to overrule Meador in the
1984 revision of the code articles on obligations had failed. "With minor
language change the Meador interpretation of La. Civ. Code art. 1934(3)
... has been incorporated in La. Civ. Code art. 1998. . . .85
After going to great lengths to reaffirm Meador, the court stated
that the Meador rule would not resolve the legal question at issue in
this case. In the court's opinion, Lafleur, which involved a sale, con-
tained both delictual as well as contractual elements, whereas Meador,
which involved a service contract, had no delictual element. A distinction
was made between "a normal breach of contract not involving delictual
conduct" which is governed by current Civil Code art. 1998 and "con-
tract situations where there occur damages by reason of fault which are
distinct from and/or in addition to breach of a conventional obliga-
80. Bourne, 463 So. 2d at 1360.
81. Fontenot, 478 So. 2d at 1386.
82. Lafleur, 491 So. 2d 628.
83. Id. (citations omitted).
84. Id. at n.3 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 629.
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tion."' s6 This latter category was a distinct reference to Weber 7 and its
progeny which hold, according to the Lafleur court, that:
[The] breach of the obligation (to produce and deliver a product
which is reasonably safe for its intended use) gives rise to a
cause of action in favor of the purchaser of the product not
only to demand return of the purchase price, but also, because
the manufacturer is presumed to know of defects in its products,
to demand all damages caused by the defect."8
The problem faced by the court was that the facts in Lafleur did
not fit comfortably into either category. Due to the "delictual" aspects
(i.e., the seller/manufacturer's delivery of a defective thing) Lafleur was
not what the court considered to be a "normal breach of contract"
situation. However, due' to the lack of personal injury-the plaintiffs
suffered only economic and non-pecuniary loss-it would be hard to
equate Deere with "the Weber type manufacturer, essentially a tortfeasor
with obligation to pay tort damages including mental pain and an-
guish." 9
Confronted with the difficult question of whether Deere should be
treated as a Weber type tortfeasor or simply as a vendor of a useless
product, the court opted to "leave that decision for another day." 90
Due to the scant evidence presented by the plaintiffs in support of their
non-pecuniary damage claim, the court decided that there was "simply
no way" to allow the plaintiffs their respective awards of $125,000 and
$10,000 for mental pain and anguish. The court stated, "Even if we
were to ... conclude that Deere was akin to a Weber ... type 'tort-
feasor'. . we would have to conclude, and we do so conclude, that
such worry is not within the scope of the risk to which is extended
Deere's duty to deliver a useful grain drill." 91
Proposed Resolutions to "Tough Questions"
The court's decision to postpone the resolution of this troubling
issue preserves the current state of legal uncertainty. Louisiana's products
liability law is largely a jurisprudential creation. While cases such as
Phillippe further advance the interests of consumers, they conflict with
the code articles governing redhibition and create the confusion illustrated
in Lafleur.
86. Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
87. See supra note 2.
88. Lafleur, 491 So. 2d at 630.
89. Id. at 631.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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The supreme court's unwillingness to impose delictual liability for
John Deere's "tortious act" of delivering a redhibitorily defective prod-
uct to a purchaser intimates a retreat from the broad language of
Philippe. The court's reluctance stems from two aspects of the case.
First, Lafleur did not involve what the court referred to as "a significant
delictual aspect"-presumably a personal injury. This distinction is not
completely satisfying, for it would seem to imply that damage to property
is not delictual. Such an idea is contrary to prior jurisprudence. Weber,
Louisiana's seminal products liability case, was a suit against the man-
ufacturer of cattle dip for the loss of cattle and for the illness of the
plaintiff's sons. Although personal injury was involved (the court awarded
$100 to each son for temporary nausea and physical distress), the brunt
of the action concerned the damage to property (the loss of seven head
of cattle) for which the court awarded $2,650. Surely the present court
does not intend to draw a line which would categorize the marketing
of an unreasonably dangerous product that causes only property damage
as nondelictual.
Second, the court was troubled by the fact that the grain drill was
simply useless under article 2520 and not unreasonably dangerous. This
distinction is much more convincing. It seems quite logical that while
all Weber defects (unreasonably dangerous products) are redhibitorily
defective (so useless, inconvenient or imperfect to use that had the buyer
known of the defect he would not have purchased it), all redhibitory
defects are not Weber defects. If the resolution of the "tough questions"
in Lafleur "may ultimately involve line drawing by [the] Court," 92 then
a line between the unreasonably dangerous product and the useless
product might be appropriate.
If the court is intent on maintaining the principle enunciated in
Philippe, it could simply narrow the holding by stating that the man-
ufacturer's act of delivering an unreasonably dangerous thing, when he
knows of the defect, gives rise to delictual, as well as contractual,
liability. This would keep a manufacturer's delivery of a useless product
well within the contractual realm.
As previously mentioned, the legislature has provided specific statutes
governing both contractual and delictual relationships and the corre-
92. Lafleur, 491 So. 2d at 631. The court stated that line drawing may be the ultimate
resolution,
for in theory at least there is legal justification for deciding a) especially if
personal injury is not involved, that the Legislature has clearly spoken to contract
cases and said in C.C. art. 1998 that nonpecuniary damages are to be allowed
only when the contract is intended to gratify a non-pecuniary interest, or
conversely, b) although contractual, the manufacturer's duty is in tort as well,
even where the fault is simply in performance of a contract and the attending
damages merely pecuniary.
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sponding duties and remedies associated therewith. The jurisprudence
reveals a slow erosion of these distinctions, an erosion which has caused
certain statutory differences between contract and tort to be disregarded.
The growth of products liability law, an area which is closely related
to both contractual actions and delictual actions, increases the difficulty
of preserving the distinctions between the two actions. It has been
suggested that:
[T]he encroachment of the field of delict into that formerly
occupied .. . by contract has not been due to inherent faults
in the institution of contract but to the fact that in use it became
inflexible, standardized, and too often a tool in the hands of
the powerful to coerce the weaker party . . . . The injured
consumer of defectively made products, who for so long had
been unable to get redress from the seller on the manufacturer
because of contract restrictions, is now given protection in the
field of tort . . .,,93
Louisiana courts have responded to the "modern" theory of products
liability by allowing the purchaser of an unreasonably dangerous product
to recover attorneys' fees as allowed by the redhibition articles and non-
pecuniary damages as allowed by the articles governing torts.
As the late Justice Tate stated, "[i]t is the genuine desire of almost every
judge to achieve an individually fair and socially practical result, within
(he hopes) the bounds of self-restraint respecting the limitations of
statute, doctrine, procedure, and theory." 94 However, this quest for
justice is so strong that on occasion a solution is adopted which appears
to be in contravention to the express will of the legislature. 95 Philippe
was just such a situation, where the court, in an effort to reach a just
result, applied a delictual damage provision to a contractual duty. The
broad language of Philippe has led to a further derogation of the
contract/tort distinction. In Lafleur, the Philippe language provided a
basis for awarding delictual damages for the sale of a useless grain drill,
a situation for which the code articles governing sales provide a clear
and precise remedy. Although delictual (i.e., non-pecuniary) damages
were not awarded, the possibility of such an award remains.
The code articles governing sales could provide a sufficient basis to
adequately remedy a purchaser who sustains personal injury from an
unreasonably dangerous product. Had the legislature opted to allow for
93. Stone, Comments to Civil Responsibility: A Contribution Towards a Rediscovery
of Contractual Liability, in Essays on the Civil Law of Obligations 104, 105-06 (J. Dainow
ed. 1969).
94. Tate, The "New" Judicial Solution: Occasions for and Limits to Judicial Crea-
tivity, 54 Tul. L. Rev. 877, 909 (1980).
95. Id.
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the recovery of non-pecuniary damages "in all contract cases, with the
only reservation being that recovery be 'according to the nature of the
contract, or according to the circumstances surrounding the obligor's
failure to perform," '96 the field of contract would have the "flexibility"
required to redress a purchaser's injuries, regardless of whether the
damage was to property or person. 97 However, in the recent obligations
revision, 98 the legislature declined to expand contractual damages. Thus,
personal injuries resulting from the purchase of an unreasonably dan-
gerous product will continue to spawn both delictual actions and re-
dhibitory actions in order to fully redress the buyer's injury. Although
the sale of an unreasonably dangerous product may continue to overlap
into the realm of tort, the sale of a merely useless product is well within
the realm of contract and should be treated as such in future cases.
The application of a delictual remedy to the sale of a useless product
is not necessary to adequately redress the injured purchaser and overlooks
the recent legislative pronouncement maintaining the limitations on con-
tractual damages.
Robert E. Landry
96. Lafleur, 491 So. 2d at 629.
97. For a thorough discussion of allowing non-pecuniary damages in contract cases
see Litvinoff, Moral Damages, 38 La. L. Rev. 1 (1977).
98. 1984 La. Acts No. 331.
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